June 30, 2017
MacLean's book is, in the words of Duke political scientist Mike Munger, a work of "speculative historical fiction." Quotes are mangled and chopped to convey a meaning precisely the opposite meant by the authors, articles are misunderstood, arguments are distorted beyond recognition, and she is unable to understand the intellectual project of Buchanan and public choice theory. She also offers reports on people and events that are contradicted by those involved and publicly available facts. The result is a fun story, but one that bears little resemblance to the truth.
Unlike some of the negative reviewers, and many of the positive ones, I have read the entire book cover to cover. I also was a student of Jim Buchanan’s in the mid-80s and I have a 30 year career as a professional economist and scholar of libertarian ideas. Over that time, a very small fraction of my income has been from Koch-sponsored organizations. However, claiming those connections are reason to dismiss this review, and that of other Buchanan and public choice scholars, is to commit the ad hominem fallacy. Many of us have offered textual specifics, as I do below, demonstrating the flaws of the book. Those are what matter for judging the intellectual quality of this book.
A quick Google search will turn up dozens of links comparing MacLean’s text with that of her source material, demonstrating her errors of fact and interpretation, and her limited understanding of the theories she is criticizing. For example, consider the following passage in which she accuses Buchanan et. al. of wanting to go back to a 19th century view of the constitution that she finds horrific. She writes (227), with the quote being from The Calculus of Consent:
“[Buchanan] and his co-author Gordon Tullock said that the nation’s decision-making rules were closer to “the ‘ideal’ in 1900 than in 1960.””
She then goes on to catalog the problems of 1900, some of which are legitimate concerns of course, such as Jim Crow. MacLean wants to claim that this is the world Buchanan and friends want to re-create today. She then writes (228) “Had Buchanan’s ideal system of 1900 endured at the national level…” followed by a list of horrors that the Great Depression “might well” have engendered.
Note first that what was once the constitution he thought was “closer to the ideal” has now become his “ideal.” A minor bit of slippery phrasing, but not a huge sin. But it was enough to make me want to check the source. Below I reprint the relevant passages in TCoC so you can make up your own mind as to how accurately MacLean has represented Buchanan and Tullock. The context is their discussion of the costs of various sets of rules:
“The question remains, however, as to whether or not the existing organizational reduces the overall interdependence costs (external costs plus decision-making costs) to the lowest possible level. Saying that external costs will be present in the “ideal” organization is not equivalent to saying that any organization embodying pressure-group activity is, in any sense, ideal.
No direct measurement of the total interdependence costs under existing or alternative decision-making rules is readily available. Certain conclusions can be drawn, however, on the basis of the facts of history. We may observe a notable expansion in the range and extent of collective activity over the last half century—especially in that category of activity appropriately classified as differential or discriminatory legislation. During the same period we have witnessed also a great increase in investment in organized interest-group efforts designed specifically to secure political advantage. These facts allow us to reach the conclusion that the constitutional rules that were “optimal” in 1900 are probably not “optimal” in 1960. If we may assume that the fundamental rules for organizing collective decisions were more closely in accordance with the “ideal” in 1900 than in 1960, these same rules will tend to produce a higher level of interdependence costs than necessary. This suggests that some shifting in the direction of more inclusive decision-making rules for collective choice and some more restrictive limits on the range of collective activity might now be “rational” to the individual considering constitutional changes. The contrary possibility, of course, also exists. If the operation of existing constitutional rules produces roughly “optimal” results today, clearly these same rules were overly restrictive in earlier stages of development marked by relatively less organized pressure for differential legislation.”
Rather than making a unilateral call to return to 1900, to the degree they do reach a conclusion, it’s that in the actual world of 1960, the rules of 1900 are “probably” not optimal or ideal. In the sentence after the one she quotes, they reach a conclusion the exact opposite of what she reports. Perhaps they are arguing for a more restrictive set of limits on majorities are required in 1960, but the context suggests that it is not majorities per se that they wish to throttle, but special interest groups who are able to exercise what amounts to minority rule through the process of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs familiar to so many of us. That process is part of what creates the external costs that are at the center of this discussion.
The point at issue is that claiming that Buchanan wants to go back to what he saw as the “ideal” constitution of 1900 is simply false. And the book is full of just these sorts of misreadings and misuses of her source material. Several living authors have stepped forward with similar textual evidence of distorted quotations and meanings of their own work.
And all should read Munger's review of the book at the website of The Independent Review. Consider just one point he raises: MacLean shares a campus at Duke with three current or past presidents of the Public Choice Society, one of whom was a prominent co-author of Buchanan's. A historian committed to getting the story right could have walked across campus and talked to any of the three of them about the ideas, persons, and events she describes. She made no effort to do so. None.
As her critics continue to provide textual evidence of the book’s failings, MacLean has not responded to the particulars and has attempted to distract people away from them by inventing stories of the Kochs and their supposed operatives engaging in a coordinated effort to silence her that, again, bears no relationship to the facts.
If MacLean’s story in her book is true, then she should have no problem showing how “Koch operatives” are wrong by pointing to the facts, texts, and documents in question and showing how her version is superior to that of the critics. She has yet to do so.
Her anger at the forces on the right that she believes are harming this country has caused a fine scholar to write a tract that ultimately ends up in the left-wing version of the conspiracy theories of the alt-right that she rightly decries. It's a shame, because the fight against Trump and the reactionary forces that support him is too important to wage by sacrificing a commitment to the truth. Serious people should pass on reading this book.
Unlike some of the negative reviewers, and many of the positive ones, I have read the entire book cover to cover. I also was a student of Jim Buchanan’s in the mid-80s and I have a 30 year career as a professional economist and scholar of libertarian ideas. Over that time, a very small fraction of my income has been from Koch-sponsored organizations. However, claiming those connections are reason to dismiss this review, and that of other Buchanan and public choice scholars, is to commit the ad hominem fallacy. Many of us have offered textual specifics, as I do below, demonstrating the flaws of the book. Those are what matter for judging the intellectual quality of this book.
A quick Google search will turn up dozens of links comparing MacLean’s text with that of her source material, demonstrating her errors of fact and interpretation, and her limited understanding of the theories she is criticizing. For example, consider the following passage in which she accuses Buchanan et. al. of wanting to go back to a 19th century view of the constitution that she finds horrific. She writes (227), with the quote being from The Calculus of Consent:
“[Buchanan] and his co-author Gordon Tullock said that the nation’s decision-making rules were closer to “the ‘ideal’ in 1900 than in 1960.””
She then goes on to catalog the problems of 1900, some of which are legitimate concerns of course, such as Jim Crow. MacLean wants to claim that this is the world Buchanan and friends want to re-create today. She then writes (228) “Had Buchanan’s ideal system of 1900 endured at the national level…” followed by a list of horrors that the Great Depression “might well” have engendered.
Note first that what was once the constitution he thought was “closer to the ideal” has now become his “ideal.” A minor bit of slippery phrasing, but not a huge sin. But it was enough to make me want to check the source. Below I reprint the relevant passages in TCoC so you can make up your own mind as to how accurately MacLean has represented Buchanan and Tullock. The context is their discussion of the costs of various sets of rules:
“The question remains, however, as to whether or not the existing organizational reduces the overall interdependence costs (external costs plus decision-making costs) to the lowest possible level. Saying that external costs will be present in the “ideal” organization is not equivalent to saying that any organization embodying pressure-group activity is, in any sense, ideal.
No direct measurement of the total interdependence costs under existing or alternative decision-making rules is readily available. Certain conclusions can be drawn, however, on the basis of the facts of history. We may observe a notable expansion in the range and extent of collective activity over the last half century—especially in that category of activity appropriately classified as differential or discriminatory legislation. During the same period we have witnessed also a great increase in investment in organized interest-group efforts designed specifically to secure political advantage. These facts allow us to reach the conclusion that the constitutional rules that were “optimal” in 1900 are probably not “optimal” in 1960. If we may assume that the fundamental rules for organizing collective decisions were more closely in accordance with the “ideal” in 1900 than in 1960, these same rules will tend to produce a higher level of interdependence costs than necessary. This suggests that some shifting in the direction of more inclusive decision-making rules for collective choice and some more restrictive limits on the range of collective activity might now be “rational” to the individual considering constitutional changes. The contrary possibility, of course, also exists. If the operation of existing constitutional rules produces roughly “optimal” results today, clearly these same rules were overly restrictive in earlier stages of development marked by relatively less organized pressure for differential legislation.”
Rather than making a unilateral call to return to 1900, to the degree they do reach a conclusion, it’s that in the actual world of 1960, the rules of 1900 are “probably” not optimal or ideal. In the sentence after the one she quotes, they reach a conclusion the exact opposite of what she reports. Perhaps they are arguing for a more restrictive set of limits on majorities are required in 1960, but the context suggests that it is not majorities per se that they wish to throttle, but special interest groups who are able to exercise what amounts to minority rule through the process of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs familiar to so many of us. That process is part of what creates the external costs that are at the center of this discussion.
The point at issue is that claiming that Buchanan wants to go back to what he saw as the “ideal” constitution of 1900 is simply false. And the book is full of just these sorts of misreadings and misuses of her source material. Several living authors have stepped forward with similar textual evidence of distorted quotations and meanings of their own work.
And all should read Munger's review of the book at the website of The Independent Review. Consider just one point he raises: MacLean shares a campus at Duke with three current or past presidents of the Public Choice Society, one of whom was a prominent co-author of Buchanan's. A historian committed to getting the story right could have walked across campus and talked to any of the three of them about the ideas, persons, and events she describes. She made no effort to do so. None.
As her critics continue to provide textual evidence of the book’s failings, MacLean has not responded to the particulars and has attempted to distract people away from them by inventing stories of the Kochs and their supposed operatives engaging in a coordinated effort to silence her that, again, bears no relationship to the facts.
If MacLean’s story in her book is true, then she should have no problem showing how “Koch operatives” are wrong by pointing to the facts, texts, and documents in question and showing how her version is superior to that of the critics. She has yet to do so.
Her anger at the forces on the right that she believes are harming this country has caused a fine scholar to write a tract that ultimately ends up in the left-wing version of the conspiracy theories of the alt-right that she rightly decries. It's a shame, because the fight against Trump and the reactionary forces that support him is too important to wage by sacrificing a commitment to the truth. Serious people should pass on reading this book.
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