SATURDAY, OCT 24, 2015
Ronald Reagan stiff-armed the religious right: What today’s GOP must learn before wingnuts swallow it whole
On abortion, school prayer and Justice O'Connor, Reagan contained the religious right without giving them victories
“Reagan wins!” exclaimed the headlines across the media outlets of the Religious Right in 1980. It was hard to show humility—or patience—after such a huge election they had helped bring about, but religious conservatives quickly learned their agenda wouldn’t be the first priority of the Reagan White House. Instead, the White House explained Reagan first had to address the nation’s poor economy and tackle the tax burden. But once the president’s tax package passed, it became clear the Reagan administration would give little attention to the conservative moral issues the Religious Right had expected the new president to address. The journalist Lou Cannon, working on a biography of Reagan during his first administration, asked a presidential adviser what the White House planned to give the Religious Right. “Symbolism,” the staffer responded. Pointing to the blockbuster film, The Godfather, the adviser explained the Reagan White House intended to follow the mafia don’s philosophy, “Hold your friends close, hold your enemies closer.” He elaborated, “We want to keep the Moral Majority types so close to us they can’t move their arms.” The Washington Post quoted a more high-ranking Reagan staffer, Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, who said the only way any Religious Right leaders could enter the White House would be through “the back door.”
Another journalist covering the Reagan White House, Sidney Blumenthal, found the president’s team practiced a tacit “containment strategy” whereby key Senate leaders and White House staffers were encouraged to meet regularly with Religious Right operatives to discuss pressing concerns so to give the appearance that work was being done on the issues without actually delivering on them in any substantive way. This would keep the Religious Right happy—or at least, distractedly busy—while not eliciting the concern of Reagan’s larger, more secular support. Small gestures could be extended, like proposing a bill on a tiny aspect of a larger social concern or delivering a speech to a key Religious Right organization, but less effort would be done to see that such a bill—let alone one with more political substance—would pass or that a speech’s promises would actually be carried out. Morton Blackwell, a presidential assistant, was responsible for looking after the Religious Right constituency and given the charge to keep them, as Blumenthal explains, “in a state of perpetual mobilization.” “The flaw in that strategy,” Blumenthal notes, “was that the White House served as an incubator for the movement it was trying to contain.” Of course, with Religious Right operatives, Blackwell presented a different explanation of the White House’s strategy. In a letter to a Moral Majority leader, Blackwell explained that the White House would approach the Religious Right’s agenda through a tactic of “incrementalism.” “The fact is that it works,” Blackwell contended. “It is unrealistic to expect to undo fifty years of bad increments in one year or even in one presidential term. . . . A foolish belief in the possibility of total, instant victory is a prescription for unrealistic hopes and early disillusionment at the grassroots.”
The first disappointment the president’s evangelical supporters admitted concerned the administration’s lack of a sizeable evangelical presence, particularly since Reagan had made campaign promises that he would staff evangelicals within his administration in proportion to their representation in the American public. The idea that some 40 percent of the Reagan administration would be made up of evangelicals was preposterous, of course, but the paltry numbers of evangelicals who actually made it into the administration must have seemed even more ridiculous to those watching closely. Two scholars later counted only four evangelicals among Reagan’s thirty-one cabinet appointees, with Secretary of the Interior James Watt being the only evangelical appointed in Reagan’s first cabinet. Reagan did appoint Moral Majority executive director Robert Billings as his assistant secretary of education for non-public schools, but he was soon removed from the position because of protests from Catholic educators worried about a fundamentalist Protestant having so much power over the federal government’s relationship with parochial schools. While more evangelicals were scattered throughout the lower ranks of the White House and administration, it was no presence of note. But this hardly tempered evangelical expectations. One frustrated evangelical in the White House attracted controversy when she told a reporter Reagan’s close advisers should either “get saved or get out.”
Evangelicals’ next disappointment came when Reagan nominated Sandra Day O’Connor to the Supreme Court in his first year in office. In running for the presidency, Reagan had courted key Religious Right operatives by vowing to nominate only committed pro-life jurists to the nation’s highest court. His winning of the National Right to Life Committee’s endorsement, in fact, had been secured in two private meetings with NRLC president Carolyn Gerster where he had promised her just that. O’Connor, then, was a startling choice. Pro-lifers dug up O’Connor’s voting records from her time as an Arizona state legislator and found a worrisome history of pro-choice votes. Reagan’s “shocking intention,” in the words of a Christian Action Council fundraising letter, to nominate O’Connor seemed an especially insulting move to pro-life activists, and anti-abortion newspapers and magazines decried the president’s move. At the White House, fifty leaders from various Religious Right organizations complained to Morton Blackwell of their growing sense that, given his actions, the president didn’t “think this coalition contributed significantly to his election.”
Internally, the Religious Right faced challenges of its own making. Importantly, for all the talk of an ecumenical movement on behalf of conservative social issues, the Religious Right operated largely along denominational lines in its dealings with the Reagan White House. At the leadership ranks, Religious Right organizations sometimes coordinated with each other, but more often worked alone or in partnership, especially evangelical and fundamentalist groups, with like-minded believers. This had been the case in the run-up to the 1980 election, but divided operations in a campaign season seemed the most logical way to mobilize diverse constituencies. The conviction among conservative Catholics, Mormons, and evangelicals that Ronald Reagan was the man they needed in the White House to deliver on their goals had united their divided efforts. Once Reagan assumed the presidency, these disparate strands of conservative Christianity would come together as the bloc representing traditionalism and religious values—a moral majority, one might describe it—to make sure the president turned the nation back to God and delivered on their agenda.
While there were moments of cooperation and common cause within the Religious Right during the Reagan years, far more often the various components of the network worked in isolation, opening up divisions even within shared issues and working in direct opposition on other issues they had never really discussed. The Religious Right foundered at what could have been its best moment, riven by theological disagreements that yielded political consequences and often divided by different political objectives reflecting their unique theological convictions. What emerged during the Reagan years was at best a loose coalition of religious conservatives, frequently fraught with dissension, disagreement, and the possibility of dispersion. For a White House that hesitated over aligning itself too closely with what often appeared a radioactive Religious Right, the divisions within the network proved a useful scapegoat. Rather than working to smooth over disagreements and broker compromises, Reagan officials largely sat back and allowed the infighting and disunity to continue, then pointed to the chaos as a way to avoid the responsibility of leadership or to explain away disappointing legislative setbacks. On the Religious Right’s two major objectives for the Reagan presidency—school prayer and abortion—the network’s fractured nature helped doom policy objectives that had always been a formidable prospect. And on other issues of national concern, including welfare reform and the nuclear arms race, evangelicals, Catholics, and Mormons took differing positions that demonstrated their political divergence and challenged the notion of a conservative ecumenism.
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